Warren Buffett is no longer chairman of Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A, BRK.B), formally closing one of the most consequential chapters in modern investing.
Buffett acquired Berkshire in 1965 and transformed a struggling textile company into a conglomerate that spans insurance, railroads, energy, manufacturing, retail, and a massive portfolio of publicly traded stocks.
The financial record behind that transformation is extraordinary. From 1965 through 2025, Berkshire’s per-share market value compounded at 19.7% annually, compared with 10.5% for the S&P 500 with dividends included. Berkshire’s overall gain from 1964 through 2025 was 6,099,294%, versus 46,061% for the S&P 500.
But Buffett’s legacy is more than a string of winning stock picks.
He mixed business ownership, insurance underwriting, investment income, huge cash reserves, and a willingness to hold assets for years or decades. Buffett’s legacy also includes costly mistakes, such as Dexter Shoe and Kraft Heinz.
Now Greg Abel is responsible for the next phase. Howard Buffett will step into the non-executive chairman role, while Abel will remain as CEO and take on the capital-allocation challenge Buffett has handled for decades.
Buffett’s investment style was about businesses, not stock prices
Buffett’s approach to investing differed from Benjamin Graham’s value investing strategy, but over the years it moved away from purchasing statistically inexpensive stocks and toward buying good quality firms at reasonable costs.
The underlying premise was simple: Know the firm, understand its competitive advantages, decide whether it can generate attractive returns on capital, and acquire it at a price that gives space for a good return.
That mindset led to some of Berkshire’s most lucrative investments.
See’s Candies became a case study. In 1972, Berkshire purchased the firm for $25 million. See’s had earned $857 million pretax through 1999, Buffett wrote later, and had needed little extra cash.
Similarly, Berkshire developed its public-stock portfolio using the same principle.
At June 30, 2026, Berkshire held $323.8 billion of equity securities. Its five largest holdings accounted for 66% of that portfolio and were Alphabet (GOOGL), American Express (AXP), Apple (AAPL), Bank of America (BAC), and Coca-Cola (KO).
That focus is a key feature of the Buffett approach. When Berkshire had great faith in a firm, it was ready to invest serious money behind it.
Berkshire’s financial engine was bigger than Buffett’s stock picks
The less visible aspect of the Buffett equation was insurance.
Berkshire’s insurance businesses create “float,” which is money received from policyholders that Berkshire may invest before it has to pay claims.
The insurance float at Berkshire was around $176 billion as of the end of 2025, up from $169 billion at the end of 2023. Berkshire’s combined insurance businesses made pretax underwriting profits in each of the three years through 2025, indicating the corporation was essentially being paid to keep much of that investment cash.
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That cash was a great source for investment.
In 2025, Berkshire generated $44.5 billion of operating earnings, down from $47.4 billion in 2024 but above its $37.5 billion five-year average. It also generated $46 billion of operating cash flow.
Berkshire’s financial machine
$176 billion: Insurance float at year-end 2025
$44.5 billion: 2025 operating earnings
$46 billion: 2025 operating cash flow
$323.8 billion: Equity securities at June 30, 2026
$359.2 billion: Cash, cash equivalents, and Treasury bills at June 30, 2026
$747.9 billion: Berkshire shareholders’ equity at June 30, 2026
It is important to distinguish between operational profit and reported net income. Berkshire’s GAAP results may be volatile due to the pass-through of market value movements of stock holdings as profits.
What Buffett got wrong is part of the investment lesson
Buffett’s career has included some huge gaffes, and Berkshire’s financials highlight the importance of pricing and the company’s quality.
Maybe the most famous case is Dexter Shoe. Berkshire purchased it in 1993, but Buffett subsequently said the acquisition was a mistake. Berkshire overpaid, and using Berkshire stock to finance the purchase compounded the error, he added.
Kraft Heinz is a more recent example.
Berkshire took a $5 billion impairment on its stake in Kraft Heinz in 2025. The impairment reflected Berkshire’s assessment of the investment’s carrying value, relative to fair value and other factors, the annual report said.
These mistakes show a flaw in the Buffett method: A strong brand or well-known business does not, on its own, make a good investment. The price paid, changes in consumer behavior, management decisions, and industry’s economics still matter.
Warren Buffett’s greatest investment may be Berkshire itselfKevin Dietsch / Getty Images
Greg Abel inherits an enormous balance sheet
Abel took the reins of Berkshire Hathaway in an extremely strong financial situation.
As of June 30, 2026, Berkshire’s total assets were $1.26 trillion, and total shareholders’ equity was $750.2 billion. Berkshire’s shareholders’ equity was $747.9 billion, compared with $717.4 billion at the end of 2025.
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Berkshire reported net profits attributable to shareholders of $35.8 billion for the first six months of 2026, including after-tax investment gains of around $11.4 billion.
Total revenue was $195.5 billion, up from $182.2 billion in the comparable period of 2025. Operating businesses continued to generate substantial earnings: BNSF produced $2.9 billion of net earnings in the first half, while Berkshire Hathaway Energy generated $2 billion, and manufacturing, service, and retailing businesses generated $7.7 billion.
Abel also has begun investing Berkshire’s money.
The corporation finalized its $9.4 billion purchase of OxyChem in January and completed its roughly $6.8 billion purchase of Taylor Morrison Home Corp. in July.
Those deals provide a first glimpse of Berkshire after Buffett’s active hand in capital allocation.
What comes next for Berkshire Hathaway?
Abel is not getting a clean slate. He inherits a corporation with huge cash, a concentrated stock portfolio, attractive operational companies, and an insurance operation that can generate investment funds.
The issue is whether that financial engine can continue to multiply at favorable rates as Berkshire becomes bigger.
Buffett’s own record shows that the solution is not simply to repeat the past. The 19.7% annualized return since 1965 is an outstanding historical performance for Berkshire, but the firm is now substantially bigger and has fewer chances that can move the whole operation in a meaningful way.
Abel has already shown willingness to spend billions of dollars running businesses. His actions will be more critical to whether Berkshire’s massive cash pile becomes acquisitions, investments, share buybacks, or stays on the balance sheet.
Howard Buffett’s job is another thing. He is supposed to help maintain the culture as non-executive chairman, not oversee Berkshire’s companies.
And it establishes a potentially crucial division of labor: Howard Buffett is the guardian of the culture, and Greg Abel is the steward of the capital.
The financials offer Abel a lot to work with.
The problem is where to place it.
So the next chapter for Berkshire won’t be judged solely on whether Abel can discover another Apple or Coca-Cola.
Decentralized management, insurance float, financial discipline, and long-term capital allocation will be tested to see whether Buffett’s system can continue to create value without him.
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